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In an experiment we investigate preferences for allocation of a public good among group
members who contributed unequally in providing the public good. Inducing the group
goal of productivity resulted in preferences for equitable allocations, whereas inducing
the group goals of harmony and social concern resulted in preferences for equal
final outcomes. The study makes a contribution by simultaneously treating provision
and allocation of a public good, thus viewing these as related processes. Another
contribution is that a new paradigm is introduced that bears closer resemblance to
real life public good dilemmas than previous research paradigms do.
Keywords: group goal, public good dilemma, social dilemma, public good provision, allocation, equity, equal
shares, equal final outcomes
INTRODUCTION
Individuals in groups often choose between acting selfishly or cooperatively. Social dilemma
research investigates this tension between individual and collective rationality. Specifically, a social
dilemma is a mixed-motive conflict in which members of a group decide whether to maximize the
own interest or the interest of the group. The dilemma is that, no matter how other members of
the group choose, it is more attractive for each individual to choose an alternative that increases his
or her selfish interest (i.e., to defect) rather than the group’s interest (i.e., to cooperate). But if all
members do this, all will receive a poorer outcome than if everyone chooses to cooperate (Dawes,
1980).
In this paper we focus on public good dilemmas, referring to that group members through
individual contributions realize or maintain a common resource from which all can benefit. Game
theory assumes that people are rational and selfish. Thus, in public good dilemmas, the rational
choice is to not contribute to the public good because non-contributors (i.e., defectors) will also
benefit from the good if provided. However, since the good can only be realized through sufficient
contributions from members of the group, all will receive less if no one contributes than if all group
members do. Consequently, considering the group’s interest, the rational choice is to contribute to
the good’s provision.
Previous theory and research on public good dilemmas have predominantly focused on
determinants of cooperation, that is, how much each group member contributes to the public
good (e.g., Chen and Komorita, 1994). In a fruitful line of research, the importance of fairness
for willingness to cooperate has been highlighted (e.g., Wilke, 1991; Kerr, 1995; Van Lange and
Messick, 1996; Eek and Biel, 2003). In general, this research suggests that people contributes to
public goods to the extent that they consider doing it as fair.
We argue that previous research has tended to neglect that public good dilemmas entail
two processes: willingness to provide the public good and preferences for how the public good
is allocated. Since these processes may not be independent of each other, it is important to
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simultaneously examine both. In the present study we do this
by investigating what is a preferred allocation of a public good
to group members who collectively have provided the public
good, and how these allocation preferences vary with the goal the
group has.
Allocation Preferences
Theory and research has focused on several allocation principles
(e.g., Kazemi and Törnblom, 2008; Törnblom and Kazemi, 2015,
see also Törnblom and Kazemi, 2012a). According to equity, also
referred to as the proportionality principle, the outcome for an
individual should be proportional to his or her contribution.
Equal shares refers to that individuals receive the same outcome
regardless of possible differences in, for instance, the size of
their contributions or personal need of the resource. According
to equal final outcomes, all individuals should receive the same
amount of the resource after it has been allocated. Thus, the
allocation takes into account the state before the allocation, that
is, each individual’s initial assets or needs (e.g., Van Dijk et al.,
1999).
Deutsch (1975) argued that equity is associated with
effectiveness and productivity. The argument is that, if an
individual who has the capacity to use a limited resource in the
most efficient way receives a greater share from the resource, it
will lead to growth of the public good and, consequently, to the
realization of the group goal. In contrast, whenever enjoyable
social relations and harmony are dominant group goals, equality
(equal shares) is likely to be applied because it enhances the
egalitarian social standing among members of the group. Need-
based allocations are endorsed in situations where the focus
is individuals’ welfare, a sense of concern and responsibility
for others. If initial differences in needs exist an allocation
principle that achieves equal final outcomes would eliminate
these differences.
We conjecture that group goals define desired future states.
Attaining these states is why a collective resource is allocated on
the basis of a given principle (Weber et al., 2004). Tenbrunsel
and Messick (1999) argued that the impact of sanctions on
cooperation is dependent on an activated frame (business vs.
ethical). In a related vein, people tend to cooperate more in social
dilemmas involving non-economic outcomes (i.e., contributing
to a social event) than in social dilemmas involving economic
outcomes (i.e., investing in a joint investment fund) (Pillutla and
Chen, 1999). Although these studies are relevant in that they
are concerned with the role of context and frames for decision
making, they do not address the issue the present study raises of
how allocation preferences vary with group goal.
The Public Good Dilemma Paradigm
Two aspects of our public good paradigm deserve attention. First,
in contrast to previous public good paradigms (e.g., Van Dijk and
Wilke, 1995), we did not specify that the good would be divided
equally among the group members. Thus, when deciding how
much to contribute, participants were uncertain about how the
public good following a successful provision of the public good
would be divided among the members. In fact, in real-life public
good dilemmas, people seldom know how public goods will be
allocated. For instance, tax payers are uncertain about how the
accumulated tax pool will be used. Thus, citizens do not know
how much benefits they would receive. Second and related to
the first aspect, the public good dilemma paradigm was extended
to allow for other principles than equality to be endorsed in the
allocation of public goods. In investigating the effects of group
goal on public good allocations, participants were told that they
in their positions as leaders would not receive anything from
the public good. Consequently, contrary to how a public good
is conventionally defined, non-excludability did not apply in the
allocation of the public good. However, we argue that our public
good simulation has a closer resemblance to real life. An example
of a real-life public good dilemma is making contributions to
charities (e.g., Cornes and Sandler, 1996). It is evident that non-
excludability does not apply in this case, and that there usually is
an individual or a group of individuals deciding how the charities
are allocated to the needy.
Another aspect of the non-excludability issue in public good
dilemmas has to do with whether real public goods are public
in the sense that they are accessible to all people. Following
Foddy (2005), restricting or excluding people’s access to scarce
public goods is a common structural solution that governmental
agencies employ. Health care, voting, immigration policy, and
drivers’ licenses are all examples of this type of solution showing
that public goods are provided only for some “publics” that in a
way qualify for benefiting from the public good. Foddy concludes
that the publics who contribute to the provision and the publics
who benefit from its provision may therefore vary. Thus, given
that real-life public goods are amenable to allocations based
on other principles than equal share, such as equity and equal
final outcomes, we believe that the present research addresses an
important point that has been overlooked in previous research.
Moreover, as Messick (1995) notes, although there is consensus
about using equality in terms of the equal shares principle in the
allocation of public goods, problems may still arise. Specifically,
the type of resource to be allocated is important (Törnblom and
Kazemi, 2012b). Messick discusses the problem of identifying
ways to allocate an expensive oriental carpet between two persons
who have equal claims to the carpet. It is obviously easier to
divide equally a continuous resource such as money. Thus, real-
life public goods cannot always be allocated equally because
“public” does not mean “accessible to all people” (Foddy, 2005)
and because public goods differ with regard to the nature of the
resource that constitutes them (Messick, 1995). In conclusion, the
present study contributes to experimental public good dilemma
research as the newly introduced paradigm mimics real-life
public goods in a way that has not been done in previous
research.
Aim and Hypotheses
The aim of this study is to examine the effects of group goal on
preferred allocations of a public good. Inducement of the group
goals of economic productivity, harmony, and social concern are
hypothesized to affect the preferred allocation of the public good.
Specifically, participants who are asked to encourage economic
productivity are expected to prefer equity, participants who are
asked to encourage harmony are expected to prefer equal shares,
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and participants who are asked to encourage social concern are
expected to prefer equal final outcomes.
Major and Deaux (1982) distinguished between four types
of allocation paradigms: allocations-to-others-only, allocations-
to-self-only, individual allocations-to-self-and-others, and
group allocations-to-self-and-others. In order to control for
potential selfish influences on allocation preferences, we used
the allocations-to-others-only paradigm according to which
participants made allocations in the role of a randomly chosen
group leader. Furthermore, we used a step-level symmetric public
good paradigm. Symmetric indicates that all participants initially
have an equal number of endowments to contribute, and the
step-level feature denotes that the public good is provided only
if a certain provision threshold is reached by the contributions,
and that additional contributions do not increase the value of the
public good.
METHODS
Participants
Fifty three female undergraduates with a mean age of 23.8 years
and seven male undergraduates with a mean age of 25.3 years
were compensated with a movie pass for participating in the
study. Their ages ranged from 19 to 45 years. An equal number
of participants (n = 20) were randomly assigned to one of three
group goal conditions representing economic productivity, social
concern, or harmony. Men were represented in all conditions.
Procedure and Materials
Participants who agreed to participate were upon arrival seated
in separate cubicles and were given a questionnaire with written
instructions. All participants were informed that they belonged
to a group consisting of five members. This information was
not possible to question since the participants could not see
each other. In order to also create a sense of interdependence
and group identification, the first page in the questionnaire
informed the participants that they were going to participate
on different occasions, and that this was the first of three
occasions. It was explained that on this first occasion the
aim was to study how people make decisions in groups
without communicating with each other. All communication
between group members was therefore to be made through the
experimenter.
Thereafter, the public good dilemma was introduced. The
instructions read (translated from the Swedish): “You are part of a
five-person group. One person will be selected as the leader of the
group. The group’s first task is to open a joint account and try to
gain interest on your money. Each of you has SEK 60. Individually
you must decide how much you want to contribute to the
account. You may contribute as much as you like (SEK 0–60).
If you jointly contribute at least SEK 120, the group receives
an interest of SEK 120. The balance of the account will then
equal SEK 240. The leader will divide this amount between the
other four members. The balance can never exceed SEK 240.
If you jointly contribute less than SEK 120, the group will not
receive the interest and contributions will not be given back to
the contributors. Write on the line below how much you want to
contribute.”
At this stage the participants were informed that their
compensation for participating was contingent on whether the
group had received the interest and how it would be allocated
among them. After the contributions had been made they were
informed that a leader whose task was to make the allocation
would be appointed through a random procedure. In fact, all
participants were bogusly told that they had been chosen to be
the leader. They were further informed that the threshold of SEK
120 had successfully been reached such that the interest (public
good) had been provided. In order to allocate the public good
between the other group members, the leader was informed about
their contributions (this information was bogus and the same for
all, see Table 1), that is, one group member contributed nothing,
another SEK 20, a third SEK 40, and the fourth SEK 60.
The group goal was introduced subsequently. For the goal
of economic productivity the instructions read (translated from
the Swedish): “Your group has a long-term goal of economic
productivity. Hence, economic profit is the primary driving force.
The emphasis is on measuring achievements with precision.” For
harmony the goal description read: “Your group has a long-term
goal of harmony. Hence, maintenance of enjoyable relations is the
primary driving force. The emphasis is on enhancing the group
spirit and fellowship.” For social concern the goal description
read: “Your group has a long-term goal of social concern. Hence,
giving help and support to fellow group members is the primary
driving force. The emphasis is on being considerate and taking
responsibility for other members.”
This was followed by the leader’s task of allocating the public
good (SEK 240) between the four group members guided by the
three principles of equity, equal shares, or equal final outcomes.
Participants’ allocations constituted the main dependent variable.
As a guide for their allocation decisions, the participants were
presented a table (similar to Table 1) showing the other group
members’ initial endowments, their contributions, their post-
contribution possessions, and how the distribution could be
made based on the three principles. Participants were also
informed that these principles merely served as examples and that
they may distribute the public good in any way they preferred. On
a line below the information provided, the participants wrote the
amounts they allocated to each group member. The participants
TABLE 1 | Information about the public good presented to participants.
Group member
A B C D Sum
Initial endowments 60 60 60 60 240
Contribution 0 60 20 40 120
Post-contribution possession 60 0 40 20 120
Equity 0 120 40 80 240
Equal shares 60 60 60 60 240
Equal final outcomes 30 90 50 70 240
The words equity, equal shares, and equal final outcomes were never mentioned
to the participants. Instead they were referred to as Principles A, B, and C.
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made only one allocation, but as in Table 1 they were shown all
three allocation principles.
We operationalized equity with reference to participants’
past performance (i.e., contributions). Equity thus rendered all
group members an amount proportional to their contributions.
Equality rendered all group members the same share of the public
good. Equal final outcomes were operationalized as an allocation
leaving all group members with the same end states. They thus all
received an amount that was inversely related to the amount they
had left after they had contributed.
A male experimenter monitored participants. After
completing the questionnaire, which required approximately
25 min, the experimenter informed the participants that the
study was over, that there would be no other occasions in the
future, and that the compensation for participating was the
same for all participants regardless of the decisions they made
during the experiment. They were thanked and paid a movie pass
(equivalent to approximately USD 11.00).
Research Ethics
The experiment was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Swedish Research Council’s ethical
principles for the humanities and social sciences. Specifically,
research participants were informed about the purpose of this
research and consent for participation was acquired from them.
Moreover, it was made clear that participation was voluntary
and the collected data would be used for research purpose only
and that the data would be stored in such a way that prevents
unauthorized persons from having access to them.
RESULTS
Contribution Decisions
Participants’ contributions ranged from SEK 20 to SEK 60,
with a mean of SEK 44.9 (SD = 14.1). Contributions did not
differ between the experimental groups. Only one participant
contributed an equal share (one-fifth) of the provision threshold.
Twenty four participants chose to contribute all, 16 contributed
half, and 10 participants contributed two-thirds of their
endowments.
Allocation Preferences
Participants’ mean preferred allocations to group members A–D
in each group goal condition are given in Table 2. Allocation
preferences were not significantly correlated with contributions
(requity =−0.11; requal shares = 0.07; requal final outcomes =−0.05).
In order to construct a measure of allocation preference for
the three proposed principles of equity, equality, and equal final
outcomes, three difference scores were computed as the sum of
the absolute difference between participants’ allocations to each
of the group members A–D and the corresponding allocations
according to the principles. For instance, the sum difference
score from the equity principle was obtained by subtracting
participants’ allocations from 0 for A, from 120 for B, from 40 for
C, and from 80 for D, and then summing the absolute differences.
Thus, the smaller the sum difference scores for the principle, the
closer the allocations are to this principle.
Means of the sum difference scores are displayed in Table 3
as well as the frequencies of participants who exactly followed
any of the allocation principles. As highlighted by the italicized
values in the table, the allocations were closest to equity for
economic productivity and closest to equal final outcomes for
both harmony and social concern. It may also be noted that
52 participants (87%) made allocations exactly following one of
the principles. A χ2-test showed that for those participants the
association between goal condition and allocation principle was
significant, χ2(4)= 18.63, p= 0.001.
Three separate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs)1
on the sum difference scores were conducted to test the
effect of group goal on allocation preference according to the
three principles. Group goal was significant in each ANOVA,
F(2,57) = 6.24, p = 0.004, ω2 = 0.15 (equity), F(2,57) = 5.51,
p = 0.006, est. ω2 = 0.13 (equal shares), and F(2,57) = 8.47,
p< 0.001, ω2 = 0.27 (equal final outcomes). The difference from
1Two-way factorial ANOVAs were also performed including as the additional
factor whether participants contributed all their endowments (1) versus only part
of it (−1). No significant effects at p < 0.05 of the contribution factor were
observed.
TABLE 2 | Means and Standard deviations of allocations related to group
goal.
Group member
A B C D
Economic productivity M 18.3 103.5 46.4 71.9
SD 22.2 22.1 8.3 9.9
Harmony M 26.0 94.0 48.5 71.5
SD 13.5 13.5 4.9 4.9
Social concern M 40.5 79.5 52.5 67.5
SD 22.4 22.4 6.4 6.4
TABLE 3 | Means and standard deviations of sum difference scores and
frequencies of preferred allocation principle related to group goal.
Group goal Allocation principle
Equity Equal shares Equal final
outcomes
Economic productivity M 49.5 111.8 62.8
SD 59.3 58.7 29.8
f 9 3 3
Harmony M 69.0 91.0 17.0
SD 36.4 36.4 29.9
f 3 1 14
Social concern M 106.0 60.0 42.0
SD 55.5 51.1 44.0
f 2 7 10
The lower the difference score, the smaller is the deviation from a specified
allocation principle. f refers to the frequency of participants who exactly followed
each allocation principle (i.e., no difference) in each group goal condition. Italicized
values indicate the three lowest sum difference scores.
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equity was significantly smaller in the economic productivity
condition than the average difference from equity in the other two
conditions, t(57) = −2.70, p = 0.009. The difference from equal
shares was significantly smaller in the social concern condition
than the average difference from equal shares in the other goal
conditions, t(57)=−3.05, p= 0.004. Finally, the difference from
equal final outcomes was significantly smaller in the harmony
condition than the average difference from equal final outcomes
in the other goal conditions, t(57)=−3.67, p< 0.0012.
DISCUSSION
The present study of preferences for allocation of public
goods complements previous research investigating public good
provision (e.g., Eek and Biel, 2003). Furthermore, the results
provide compelling evidence for the impact of group goal on the
preferred allocations. This is in support of the conjecture that
group goals are viewed as decision frames such that they exert an
influence on allocation preferences (cf. Pillutla and Chen, 1999;
Weber et al., 2004).
The hypothesis that allocations according to equity are
preferred when groups are motivated to realize economic
productivity was supported. However, contrary to the hypothesis,
inducing the group goal of harmony made participants allocate
the public good according to equal final outcomes as they,
consistent with the hypothesis, also did when the group goal was
social concern. We believe that these findings partly contrary
to our hypotheses may tentatively be reconciled with our initial
line of reasoning. Specifically, since equal final outcomes equalize
positions at the end, it is still an allocation that may increase
harmony in the group at the same time as it may reflect social
concern by taking into account initial contributions to the public
good. Yet, this does not support the contention that if equal
final outcomes imply that individual contributions are neglected,
social cohesion and harmony in the group will be impaired
(Deutsch, 2000). In the present study in which participants were
similar to each other, this fact may have played a larger role
than their individual contributions. Not taking into account that
different participants did not contribute equally much may thus
have been in the interest of maintaining harmony in the group.
Perhaps in the role of leader the participants imagined some
legitimate justification for the differences in contribution such
as inequality in ability to contribute. Some participants may
also when acting as leaders themselves have belonged to those
participants that contributed less than the others.
In an experimental setting, Austin (1980) showed that
while college roommates disregarded individual differences in
performance and divided a collective resource equally, strangers
took individual differences in performance into consideration
and made equitable divisions. Similarly, Eek et al. (2001)
reported that equity was perceived as fairer than equality in
2Additional analyses revealed that the difference from equity was significantly
smaller in the harmony condition than in the social concern condition,
t(38) = 2.49, p = 0.017, and that the difference from equal final outcomes
was marginally smaller in the social concern condition than in the economic
productivity condition, t(38)= 1.75, p= 0.089.
privately provided child care, whereas in child care provided
by the municipality equality was perceived as fairer. As
collectives such as roommates and municipalities presumably
are more concerned with relational goals (i.e., harmony and
social concern) than performance-related goals (i.e., economic
productivity), previous findings are consistent with our results
in showing that collective goals guide allocation decisions.
An important implication is that implementation of a given
allocation principle may be justified in one context but not in
another (cf. Mannix et al., 1995).
The proposed relationships between group goal and allocation
preference in this research bears close resemblance to Fiske’s
(1992) work on relational models. Fiske (1992) distinguished
between four basic types: communal sharing, authority ranking,
equality matching, and market pricing. As each type has its
own norms of conduct, these schemas guide social behavior.
Thus, when a relationship is conceived in terms of communal
sharing, what is exchanged is not determined on the basis of
what each individual has contributed. Instead, the particular
resource is shared by all its members according to their need.
In communal sharing relationships the goal of social concern is
salient. When a relationship is conceived in terms of authority
ranking, individuals receive benefits based on their input in
terms of status and rank. Thus, the higher your rank in that
particular relationship, the more you receive from the collective
resource. When relationships are primarily defined in terms of
market pricing, exchanges are mainly based on what people are
able to pay or the principle of proportionality (i.e., equity). The
more you contribute, the more you are entitled to receive. In
market pricing relationships, the goal of (economic) productivity
is salient. Finally, in the equality matching mode reciprocity
and equality are emphasized. In this mode people do not share
a collective resource in accordance with their need or input
or rank, they share the resource equally. In equality matching
relationships, the goal of harmony is salient. In sum, Fiske’s
(1992) work suggests that in different types of social relationships
people seem to pursue different types of goals. Thus, it could
be argued that the induced group goals in the present research
may have activated participants’ view of the type of relationship
their group belonged to and consequently affected their preferred
allocations.
It should also be noted that the salience of a goal guiding
actions may differ depending on a group’s development phase
or the faced social situation. In support of this view, Goode
(1978) maintained that a single justice principle does not prevail
in social groups because they have a dominant goal orientation.
For instance, sororities (or fraternities) as “solidarity-oriented
groups” may not in all of their activities endorse equality or
consider it as fair or appropriate. Instead, Goode claimed that
different allocation norms apply to different phases or situations
in a group’s life rather than being based on a single norm always
being dominant in guiding the group’s actions. In real-life settings
there usually is a mixture of different goals at some point in
time which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to apply a certain
principle as being conducive to realizing a particular goal. Often
a combination of different allocation principles is needed to
operate side by side. Deutsch (2000) maintained that all three
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goals are important in a social system and that the allocation
principles can be implemented in a way that is either mutually
supportive or mutually inconsistent. He concluded that “it is a
delicate balance that often tilts too far in one direction or the
other” (p. 43).
Choice of allocation principle did not have any impact on
participants’ own outcomes. Thus, participants acted as non-
recipient allocators. This could be regarded as a limitation. We
maintain, however, that the major aim of the present research
was to investigate the “pure” effects of group goal on preferred
allocations. Toward this end, we deliberately removed the self-
interest component from the allocation task. It may still be argued
that having a leader making the allocation introduces a threat to
the external validity of the results. Nevertheless, we do not believe
that this aspect of the paradigm change our conclusions about
the role of group goal for allocation preferences. In addition, we
stress that our research participants, prior to being informed that
they had been chosen as the leader of their group, were in a
public good dilemma conflict, and that they were informed that
the outcome was contingent upon their contribution decisions.
Still, future research should more closely investigate the interplay
between the three motives of self-interest, fairness and group
goal. We also note that the unfortunate dominance of women
in our sample is another threat to the external validity of the
results. It is not implausible that women are more sensitive to
group goals in their allocation preferences than men would be.
This is however another issue to be addressed in future research.
Taken together, the present study makes three contributions to
public good dilemma research. The first lies in the simultaneous
treatment of public good provision and allocation, thus
conceiving these as related processes. Second, a new paradigm
resembling real life public good dilemmas was introduced. Third,
as group goals and resource allocation are integral parts of
all social groups, knowledge in advance of how to distribute
collective resources in order to realize these goals are essential
to group functioning and effectiveness. The present results
corroborated our line of reasoning in showing that the preferred
allocation of benefits depends on group goal. This is in line with
prior research showing that decision frames have an impact on
how people behave in social dilemmas (e.g., Pillutla and Chen,
1999; Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999). An important implication
is that preferred allocations of public goods may not primarily
depend on what contributions initially have been made but on
decision frames (in terms of future group goals once made
salient), for example, harmony, leading to the endorsement of
equal final outcomes. Hence, how benefits are allocated to group
members is crucial for the degree to which one believes that
different group goals are attained.
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